(Published Weekly no.420,1-7Oct 2020 )
We have joined the High-Income Country category but the state of the maintenance of our physical and social infrastructure and our public service standards remains appalling. Recently, mention was made that 399 of the 544 cameras installed at the high security prison of Melrose were malfunctioning, three of the eight National Coast Guard Coastal Surveillance Radar System radars, including the one in Souillac, were out of order when the Wakashio was entering into our Exclusive Economic Zone and the largest tug of the Mauritius Ports Authority, weighing 70 tons, was, out of order. Even at Mauritius Telecom, one of our many prime institutions that are being corrupted by failing and falling standards, we saw its 'Traffic Watch' cameras failing us when we needed them most.
With such a list of worsening service standards , one of our top columnist even queried about the percentage of tablets distributed in schools that are still functioning, about the breakdown rate of police vehicles and patrol officers from the NCG, the number of safe city cameras "in good condition", the health equipment (mammography, cancer treatment, artificial respirators for new born babies, etc.) that are still in working order….
It is all about government effectiveness. The quality of public service provision, the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies are critical measures to judge how efficiently and effectively government is producing and implementing the right policies and delivering public goods and services. Our civil service embarked on a reform programme to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies and increase overall productivity, adapting to the fast-changing global environment that is more responsive to expectations of citizens and businesses, while acquiring the flexibility and agility to take and implement decisions rapidly. The focus was on achieving results, encouraging initiatives while ensuring greater transparency in decision-making, accountability in management of public affairs and good governance. A crucial tool in the reform programme was Programme Based Budgeting. (PBB)
The decision of the Government to do away with Programme Based Budgeting was a most retrograde decision. It is true that the PBB, implemented by the Mansoor-Sithanen tandem with a big-bang approach in 2007, against sound advice to proceed sequentially and gradually, had continuously struggled in “deliverology” and it had become another wish-list. The Big-Bang approach, not anchored in local realities, had reduced the PBB to a mere arithmetical instrument without any usefulness to solve practical issues.
We failed in fine tuning our PBB especially in ensuring that we were carrying out “real” performance budgeting - a PBB that secures the delivery and effectiveness of Government’s major domestic policy priorities. Successful reform does not only require published targets but clear, specific definitions of success. The PBB of the Mansoor-Sithanen variant had remained very theoretical, a mere textbook exercise failing to deliver on, for example, improving the performance of elementary schools, reducing wait times in our hospitals, bringing about major reductions in crime and ensuring punctuality and fluidity of our transport system. These are important to our citizens and would benefit most from a more intensive focus and drive for implementation. It is here that the PBB needed to deliver. We have had the wrong approach to the PBB, from a strategic point of view and, consequently, its implementation has suffered. We have looked at PBB as a tool for efficiency and effectiveness of the budget, but only through indicators. The preparation of the PBB document has wrongly been presented as a stand-alone document, unrelated to the priorities of the country and the operations of the organization.
No significant budgetary reforms are likely to succeed unless a robust and functioning accounting, reporting, monitoring, evaluation and implementation facilitator/delivering system is in place. And the second step is to upgrade the system of evaluation of projects and programs which is quite weak in many ministries. Evaluation generally takes the form of financial audits. Few examples of engineering and quality control assessments for major capital projects exist. Similarly, there are rare examples of cost effectiveness studies. Attempting performance audit without agreed performance benchmarks and proper systems to record and track and evaluate performance is equally unlikely to be effective. These are some of the basics that must be satisfied for the PBB to be effective- “real” performance and policy-based budgeting - a PBB that secures delivery of government’s major domestic policy priorities.
As for our State-owned Enterprises, we can start by: (a) putting in place a transparent nomination process for the directors of boards. The key element of such a process should include developing clear selection criteria, professionalizing the nomination process and enhancing public scrutiny of the results; (b) establishing a framework for performance management. Government needs to develop a framework for communicating government’s expectations to each institution and to the public. The core of the process in most countries is the establishment of a performance agreement; (c) reviewing performance and holding institutions accountable, and (d) establishing performance incentives. E-governance must become the centre stage of our institutions to reduce physical contact and to enhance the quality of the delivery of our public services. This will also minimize opportunities for corruption
The PBB approach needs to be thoroughly reviewed, but it should not be jettisoned. PBB, when properly implemented with an effective monitoring and evaluation process, does confer greater accountability and transparency to fiscal management and delivers on efficiency and effectiveness, especially on our maintenance and service standards.
