(Published in Business Magazine No. 1009, 18-24 Sep 2013)
It has been quite some time that we have been chanting that "all is well", persisting with our business-as-usual attitude and ignoring the fact that the external current account deficit (CAD) remains our biggest worry today – and one of our most pressing macroeconomic challenges. It is better that we start doing something about the CAD before the crisis comes knocking at the door.
Table I: The Current Account Deficit
The right policies to deal with the ‘dilemma’
should aim at curbing excessive leverage and credit growth. A combination of
macro prudential policies guided by aggressive stress testing and tougher
leverage ratios are needed. Some capital controls may also be useful. In the
immediate, a combination of sterilised currency intervention and capital
account management may be unavoidable to prevent further rupee appreciation if
strong capital inflows persist. If they do not, it becomes more imperative that basic economic sensibilities
start guiding efforts to restore the shine to our structural economic story.
The CAD is not sustainable if Mauritius
stays on a path of low investment, poor productivity and weak growth.
It has been quite some time that we have been chanting that "all is well", persisting with our business-as-usual attitude and ignoring the fact that the external current account deficit (CAD) remains our biggest worry today – and one of our most pressing macroeconomic challenges. It is better that we start doing something about the CAD before the crisis comes knocking at the door.
For the eighth year running,
we have been registering large and persistent current account deficits that have been well above the sustainable
level. The Financial Stability Report (August 2013) of the Bank of Mauritius posts a current account deficit of 8.2
per cent of GDP for 2013 Q1. It was around 9.5% of GDP in 2012. What is more disquieting is that the
CAD “remained financed by net
financial flows, mainly portfolio investment and… non-residents’ direct
investment in Mauritius, net of repatriation, amounted to Rs2.2 billion in 2013
Q1.”
The 2013 IMF Article IV
Mission had warned us that growth in
2013 could be reduced by 1.75 percentage points with reduced tourism,
trade, and FDI inflows and that “large short-term capital flows linked to
the Global Business Corporations (GBCs) could also prove to be more volatile
than in the past.” The mission also noted that competitiveness appeared to
have declined over the last decade and they considered it urgent to reduce the
current account imbalance through structural reforms that would restore the
economy’s competitiveness.
The irony with the
current account situation is that it did not degenerate overnight; the problems
were known and the solutions were clear. But timely, appropriate measures to
adequately fix things to more sustainable balance-of-payments dynamics were
absent. Instead, there was a penchant for short-term fixes and band-aids,
treating symptoms rather than the disease. Policy makers assumed that growth
was on autopilot and failed to address serious structural
problems. They seemingly deliberately chose to make the economy more vulnerable
by increasing its dependence on short-term, risk-driven volatile and
unproductive capital inflows while ignoring the worsening current account
deficit.
Table I: The Current Account Deficit
%
of GDP
|
2006
|
2007
|
2008
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
2013 E
|
|
CAD
|
-9.1
|
-5.4
|
-10.1
|
-7.4
|
-8.2
|
-11.0
|
-9.5
|
-9.6
|
|
Source:
Statistics
Mauritius
Net primary income and Net transfer are exclusive of transaction of GBC1 |
|||||||||
Declining competitiveness
Inaction on structural reforms in the real
economy remains a key missing ingredient. Rather than reliance on the quick fix
of opening up the taps of capital inflows in the real estate sector (FDI in the
real estate sector, as a proportion of total FDI, has increased from 23.5% in
2006 to 60.8% in 2012),
it was crucial to institute structural
measures to bring the current account deficit to sustainable levels by
fostering competitiveness through structural reforms, and by investing in
physical and human capital, which is critical for longer-term growth prospects.
Declining
competitiveness has been our main concern going forward. Available indicators
suggest that Mauritius has become less competitive. Between 2006 and 2012, the
exports of goods and services-to-GDP ratio fell from 60% in 2006 to 54% estimated for
this year. The export of goods, exclusive of ship’s stores and bunkers,
is still more than 1% below its 2006 peak. Mauritius has not made much progress
in either the diversification of its export basket or in the destination of
Mauritian exports. A study carried out by the IMF in 2011 revealed the low
level of sophistication of our exports that has not changed much since 2004-05,
signalling a slow-down in innovation and expansion into new industries. “The
stagnation since 2004-05 points to important constraints faced by the traded
goods sector.”
Table II: Export concentration
% of exports of goods
|
2006
|
2012
|
Articles
of apparel and clothing accessories
|
36
|
36
|
Fish and fish
preparations
|
10
|
19
|
Sugar
|
16.2
|
12.0
|
In the tourism sector, projects like shopping
fiestas and carnival copycats do not seem to be generating lucrative
spillovers. We continue to lag behind our regional competitors, especially
Maldives and Seychelles. Between 2010-2012, Seychelles realized an average
growth rate of 9% (with a peak of 11.4% in 2011), and Maldives did 13% (with a
peak of 20% in 2010) while we could
barely notch up a 3% annual average rate. International tourist arrivals surged by 5%
during the first half of this year compared to the same period last year,
according to data released by the United Nations World Tourism Organization
(UNWTO). In Africa, the 4% growth of recent years was sustained during the
first half of 2013 thanks to the
continued recovery of North Africa (+4%) and the positive results of
Sub-Saharan destinations (+4%). We are indeed rapidly falling behind. While
Maldives and Seychelles logged in growth rates of 14.6%, 17.2 % respectively in tourist arrivals during the first semester of
this year, we have managed to realize a mere 1% .
The Achilles’ heel of Mauritian export
performance in recent years has been weak productivity growth. Compensation of
employees for the whole economy
increased at an annual average rate
of 7% over the period 2007-12,
while labour productivity increased by only 2.9 percent, resulting in sustained
increases in unit labour cost at an average annual rate of 4%. On the other
hand, capital productivity decreased in the same period. Indeed, the rising labour costs might have
reduced the return to capital and eroded competitiveness of the economy.
Multifactor productivity for the economy (which shows the rate of change in
productive efficiency -- that is qualitative factors such as better management
and improved quality of inputs through training and technology) grew by a mere 0.1% over the 2007-2012 period
which compares unfavourably with growth rates
of 6.1% in earlier periods.
Table
III. Manufacturing Unit Labour Cost of selected countries, 2011
Country
|
USA
|
France
|
Germany
|
Italy
|
UK
|
Mauritius
|
Taiwan
|
Korea
|
National
currency
|
0.6
|
0.3
|
-2.2
|
2.5
|
-2.3
|
6.5
|
1.8
|
-6.1
|
US $
|
0.6
|
5.3
|
2.8
|
7.7
|
1.4
|
14.4
|
9.2
|
-2.0
|
Comparing the changes in Unit Labor
Cost (ULC) in the manufacturing sector with other countries, we notice that
most of them were experiencing a relatively lower increase in ULC, the steepest
growth being for Mauritius (6.5%). The ULC in dollar terms increased by around
14.4%, one of the highest, explained by the high appreciation of the rupee
relative to the US Dollar. We certainly have lots of catching up to do in the
productivity race.
From Trilemma to Dilemma
Trying to make
the BOM a scapegoat for the growth debacle is one thing, but expecting the BOM
to be supportive in its exchange rate and monetary policies in situations of strong capital inflows shows
a lack of understanding of the impossible trinity or trilemma. This refers to
the trade-offs among the following three goals: a fixed exchange rate, an
independent monetary policy and free capital inflows (absence of capital
controls). An economy can choose at most
two of these three. This explains the trilemma before the BOM Governor when he
was to announce the monetary policy in a situation of excess liquidity as a
result of sizeable foreign inflows.
The
Governor was proposing to raise interest rates and go against the market
expectation of reducing interest rates and encouraging growth which of late had
slowed down dramatically. The trilemma implies that an economy can enjoy
capital inflows and an independent monetary policy so long at it gives up
worrying about the appreciating exchange rate. It is impossible to have all
three goals at a time.
The global financial cycle has however
transformed the “trilemma” into a ‘dilemma’ or “an
irreconcilable duo” making it still more difficult for our monetary policy
to support growth. Our monetary policy
is now more dependent than ever on the financing conditions in the main world
centres of global finance. Helen Rey of the London Business School has been
arguing recently that whenever capital
is freely mobile, the global financial cycle constrains national monetary
policies regardless of the exchange rate regime. “Independent monetary
policies are possible if and only if the capital account is managed directly or
indirectly.”
Policy response