1. Large capital inflows: Firstly,
the falling Euro only partly explains our appreciating exchange rate. As from
2007, the large capital inflows have more than offset the widening trade and current
account deficits resulting in Balance Of Payments (BOP) surpluses. There has
been a continuing build-up in foreign reserves and upward pressure on our Nominal
and Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER).
Thus the
main source of the rupee’s ascent comes from sustained foreign direct
investment inflows (mainly to IRS Schemes) in addition to portfolio investment
inflows due to the relatively higher interest rates, external commercial
borrowings and the plunging EURO.
Table 1 : Balance of Payments Surplus
Balance of Payments (BoP)
|
2007
|
2008
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
Trade Balance (cif) (Rs m)
|
-51,329
|
-64,195
|
-56,622
|
-65,332
|
-72,165
|
-as a % of GDP
|
-21.0
|
-23.4
|
-20.1
|
-21.8
|
-22.2
|
Current Account Balance (Rs m)
|
-13,248
|
-27,633
|
-20,836
|
-30,985
|
-40,680
|
-as a % of GDP
|
-5.4
|
-10.1
|
-7.4
|
-10.6
|
-12.6
|
BoP Surplus (Rs m)
|
13,880
|
4,624
|
12,103
|
6,177
|
5,200*
|
2. External competitiveness; Secondly,
one should examine the trend in our rupee not in isolation but vis-à-vis our main
export competitors. The weakening of the Euro affects all economies equally.
However all economies are not having the same price developments, cost
developments, productivity and unit labour costs. The REER that takes in these
developments is a good indicator of competitiveness. For 2011, a comparative analysis of the
textile producing countries showed that we are one of the few countries whose
currency has been appreciating against the Euro and the dollar. In real terms,
we have been appreciating excessively- around 8-10% -- meaning that we have not
been able to maintain our external competitiveness vis-à-vis some of our
immediate rivals, especially some African and Mediterranean countries that have
seen a depreciation in their currencies. The appreciation of the Rupee has
undermined the competitiveness of enterprises and also eroded their
profitability.
Main textile exporters’ currency-
January to December 2011
(% change)
|
Nominal Exchange rate
|
Nominal Exchange rate
|
Real Exchange rate
|
Real Exchange rate
|
Rs to Euro
|
Rs to $
|
Euro mkt
|
$ mkt
|
|
Indian
Rupee
|
-16
|
-16
|
-7
|
-8
|
Indonesian
Rupiah
|
2
|
0
|
6
|
4
|
Malaysian
Ringgit
|
-2
|
-3
|
0.1
|
-1
|
Pakistani
Rupee
|
-3
|
-4
|
7
|
5
|
Thai
Baht
|
-1
|
-2
|
2
|
0.1
|
South
African Rand
|
-17
|
-19
|
-11
|
-13
|
Tunisian
Dinar
|
-1
|
-3
|
2
|
1
|
Moroccan
dirham
|
0
|
-1
|
0.3
|
-1
|
Egyptian
pound
|
-2
|
-3
|
7
|
5
|
Turkey
Lira
|
-18
|
-19
|
-11
|
-12
|
Sri
Lanka Rupee
|
-1
|
-3
|
4
|
2
|
Mauritian
Rupee
|
5
|
3
|
10
|
8
|
Appreciation = +ve
3. Overvaluation of the rupee: Lastly,
given that the rupee appreciation has
been triggered by the foreign capital inflows with the particular
characteristics of a large trade deficit
and a current account deficit of about 10 per cent of GDP in 2011 Balance Of
Payments, we must ask whether the rupee
is appropriately valued. That is, it is important to assess whether the
exchange rate is properly aligned. If the exchange rate is badly misaligned it
is likely to lead to macroeconomic difficulties if policies are not adjusted.
So the exchange rate needs a benchmark – the equilibrium real exchange rate.
Our calculation using the macroeconomic balance (MB) approach that has as
determinants economic growth, oil and fiscal balance, net foreign assets, and
current account balance shows an overvaluation of some 13 % above its
equilibrium level. Taking in consideration the note of caution of “ Mauritius: 2011 Article IV
Consultation—Staff Report” of the REER being overestimated because of the
liability side of the Global Business Corporations’ activity that may be underestimated
in external sector statistics, the more recent figure (WEEK-END 4 March 2012)
of an 11% rupee overvaluation in 2011 looks reasonable.
The rationale of the Central Bank’s stance: The Central Bank exchange rate policy has been beneficial in the
short run. The strong exchange rate helped keep inflation low although oil and
food prices were firming up internationally.
The CB’s success at denting inflation and anchoring inflationary
expectations earned the government considerable goodwill. Moreover in the short
term rupee appreciation has forced the companies, which traditionally
excessively relied on competitive depreciation, to plan for an appreciation of
the rupee by hedging their foreign earnings, which however involves a cost and
making the necessary efforts at improving manufacturing efficiencies and
production. The logic was that instead of tinkering with the nominal exchange
rate to maintain external competitiveness exporting firms were expected to work
towards direct cost-cutting measures such as wage and operating cost reductions,
improving
labour productivity and enhancing capabilities. A
depreciation of the rupee while enhancing export competitiveness would have jeopardised
all that has been achieved so far- a stable rupee, low inflation, declining
interest rates and confidence in the currency and the country’s financial
sector. Moreover, as a small open economy, the cost reduction from the
depreciation can be quickly eroded through higher inflation. Worse, the higher
inflation tends to become entrenched, with adverse consequences for the
economy. But the generous wage policy, without a
corresponding improvement in productivity, and the expansionary fiscal positions
have not helped in putting the money stance in a less stressful position.
The way forward: In the absence of the losses
due to currency appreciation being neutralized with lower cost of production
emerging from higher productivity (equity participation, restructuring and
improvements in management, technology upgrading and product rationalisation
and general cost-cutting), Mauritius cannot afford the luxury of an
appreciating currency. In the long run real exchange rate appreciation reduces
export competitiveness. This effect cannot be ignored when our trade and
current account deficits are so large and our capital inflows are not
sustainable. Most of FDI inflows go to construction and real estate activities.
These are one-off investment; it does not in any way boost our export potential
or enhance our productivity and flexibility. There is no transfer technology or
know-how or any multiplier effects on the economy especially for the IRS
projects that are not integrated to the tourism industry. These real estate
activities, competing with Government spending on badly-needed infrastructure
projects, have destabilized our economy by propelling the currency upward,
squeezing export-oriented industries ranging from manufacturing to tourism and
boosting inflation. Mauritius can be said to be suffering from the "Dutch
disease," a term that broadly refers to the harmful consequences of large
inflow of foreign currency.
Export-led economies, of course, can’t take currency appreciation
lightly – it undermines competitiveness and risks eroding the country’s share
of the global market. It also invites destabilising hot-money capital inflows.
With our policymakers fretting about the persisting slowdown in demand from
Europe, the possibility of a moderation in demand from China, as well as the prospect of
long-term near-zero rates and the likelihood of further liquidity measures by both the US Federal Reserve and the European Central
Bank, our exporters who have so far maintained
competitiveness in world markets by reducing their profit mark-up in the
face of an appreciating currency feel that they have reached their upper limit .
It cannot be sustained in the long run given that productivity gains had not
proved to be sufficiently large to contribute significantly to enhancing export
price competitiveness.
Low
value-added products and those with very low or zero import intensity are the
ones that are witnessing a decline in growth. Industries with high import
content have been able to offset the negative impact due to the lower cost of
imported inputs. Thus, it is not wrong to state that low value-added and price
sensitive export items have been adversely affected by the strong rupee. These
products, already facing intensive competitive pressures, are likely to be
further impacted as world trade and output growth continue to slow down. And in
such a scenario, price renegotiation with buyers will provide a further
nightmare for these exporters, especially in the case of buyer-driven
industries such as sports goods, footwear, garments and textiles.
Thus in the long term the strong rupee driven by the capital inflows in real estate inevitably
leads to other parts of the economy becoming hollowed out meaning a weakening
of the competitiveness of the country's exports and the shrinkage of the export
sector. Thus, it is important that the Central Bank reconsiders its stance for
the long term. The Central Bank can be expected to gradually settle for the
pause mode in its strong rupee stance in the near future, now that core
inflation is under control, such that we maintain a competitive exchange rate.